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because of the emphasis placed by the court in the Kimball case on the
New York four inch rule. Adopting this questionable interpretation, the
court in the Reeves case said that the facts had properly been submitted
to the jury.
The confusion in this area obviously results when courts attempt to
follow the line of decisions supporting either the Kimball case or the
Griffin case. For about five years Ohio courts of appeal have been in
a dilemma as to which Ohio Supreme Court precedent should be followed. It appears that the plaintiff may recover in these cases under one
of the following theories: (1) where there is a defect over four inches
and the plaintiff contends that this is a nuisance as a matter of law adhering to the New York rule, and, (2) by requesting the submission of the
case to the jury where the defect is under four inches and emphasizing a
special fact which either implies greater negligence on the part of the
municipality or less responsibility on the part of the individual. This
second theory appears more reasonable. It is the authors' opinion that
this theory is already in use and should be recognized as the test of liability by the courts. For example, in the Griffin case the court emphasized
the fact that the injury occurred at night, while in the Reeves case, the
court implied that loose gravel in the hole on the sidewalk constituted a
trap. It appears that a special fact of this nature may dictate the result
of the court's decision regarding submission to the jury.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
There were few major developments in the case law concerning personal property reported in 1961; however, there were some decisions
worthy of brief comment.
GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS

The supreme court and a court of appeals both had occasion to review the basic law of gifts causa mortis. In Adams v. Fleck' the donor,
during a serious illness, gave a check to his attorney to hold for his children until his death. The check however was to be returned to the donor
if he survived the present illness. The supreme court, in holding that a
valid gift causa mortis was not made, reemphasized the rule that where
the death of the donor was a condition precedent to the vesting of title
1. 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E.2d 126 (1961).
sation section, p. 551 infra.

See also discussion in Workmen's Compen-
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in a third party, or in the donee, no valid gift causa mortis could be
made
In Koehler v. Koehler a devoted father, as a result of advanced age,
suffered an impairment of his physical and mental capacity. He was induced by his son to endorse stock certificates in blank, whereupon both
parties were made owners "in survivorship." Later, the father denied
having made the endorsements, and claimed that his signature was
forged. The court held that the father had no capacity at the time the
certificates were signed to make any kind of gift, inter vivos or causa
mortis. It could not be a gift causa mortis because of the father's lack
of intent and his failure to surrender control. Furthermore, even if it
were a gift causa mortis, the father would have revoked the gift by his
demand or by the filing of the suit.
From both of these cases, the observation can be drawn that it will
be difficult to prove a gift causa mortis in an Ohio court. The attorney
must present clear and convincing evidence of the gift, and must avoid
its being contradicted in any material respect. The attitude of the court
in applying the law to the facts of the particular gift involved will also
be important.
BAILMENTS

The case of Fawcett v. Miller4 involved the bailment of an automobile. The defendant repair shop attempted to absolve itself from liability by being classed as a gratuitous bailee rather than a bailee for hire.
The plaintiff had his car repaired, considered the work unsatisfactory, and
returned it to the garage to be improved. The garage checked the car,
found that the complaint was unjustified and returned the car to the
plaintiff. During the course of delivery of the car to the plaintiff, the
driver skidded into another car. Plaintiff brought this action against the
repair garage for damage to his automobile. The court held that the defendant was not a gratuitous bailee, as the defendant had urged, because
part of the original job for which defendant garage was hired was to
check the complaint, and therefore the bailment for hire continued.
There was dear precedent for this decision in the case of Allstate Insur5 decided by
ance Company v. Globe Auto Paint Shops, Incorporated,

the court of appeals for the same district six years before; however, the decision was not referred to by the Fawcett court.
JOHN H. WILHARM, JR.
2. For a full discussion of the ramifications of this case including the problem of whether
Ohio even recognizes gifts causa morris, see Recent Decision, p. 608 infra.
3. 113 Ohio App. 192, 171 N.E.2d 360 (1960).
4. 172 N.-2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
5. 127 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).

